Knowledge Representation for High-Level Norms and Violation Inference in
  Logic Programming by Akinkunmi, Babatunde Opeoluwa & Babalola, Moyin Florence
1 
 
Knowledge Representation for High-Level Norms and Violation Inference in Logic 
Programming 
 
B.O. AKINKUNMI
1
 and Moyin F. BABALOLA
2
 
1
Dept of Computer Science, 
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. 
2
Dept of Computer Studies, 
The Polytechnic, Ibadan, Nigeria. 
ABSTRACT 
 
Most of the Knowledge Representation formalisms developed for representing prescriptive 
norms in multi-agent normative systems can be categorized as either suitable for representing 
high-level or low level norms. We argue that low-level norm representation do not advance 
the cause of autonomy in agents in the sense that it is not the agent itself determining  the 
normative position it should be in at a particular time, on the account of a more general rule. 
In other words the agent depends on some external system for a nitty-gritty prescription of its 
obligations and prohibitions. On the other hand, high-level norms which have an explicit 
description of a norm’s precondition and have some form of implication, do not, as they exist 
in the literature, support generalized inferences about violation like low level norm 
representation formalisms do.  
 
This paper presents a logical formalism for representation of high level norms in open 
societies that enable violation inferences that detail the situation in which the norm violation 
took place and the identity of the norm violated.  
 
Norms are formalized as logic programs, whose heads each specify what an agent is obliged 
or permitted to do when some situation arises and within what time constraint of the situation. 
Each norm is also assigned an identity, using a reification scheme. The body of each logic 
programs usually describes the nature of the situation in which the agent is expected to act or 
desist from acting. This kind of violation inference is novel in the literature. 
 
Keywords: Multi-Agent Systems, Norms, Logic programs, Knowledge Representation 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Norms are used in MAS to cope with autonomy, different beliefs, interests and desires of the 
agents that cohabit in the system. Based on the normative descriptions and the actual (past 
and present) actions of the agents, the system should detect the deviating behavior of any 
agent in the system. 
 
According to Marin and Sartor(1999), there are four clear properties that can be ascribed to a 
norm of conduct. These are: applicability, (pre-)condition, effect and validity. The effect of a 
norm is what an agent must do: the obligation to carry out an action or a prohibition from 
carrying out an action. The condition is a situation that arises warranting the effect of the 
norm.  The applicability of a norm is the time that a condition must hold in order for the 
effect to hold, while the validity of a norm is determined by its inclusion in the current body 
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of code of conduct at that time.   
 
We classify most of the norms of conduct that have appeared in the literature into two 
classes. Low level norms are those that specify a normative position or effect of a norm and 
the time when (or by which) an agent is expected to conform to it.  Examples of works that 
formalize only low level norms include Sadri(2006), Stratulat et al(2001) and King et 
al(2017). We call this kind of norm representation as such because they instruct the agent on 
what to do and when to do it, rather than have the agent decide on when to act and for what 
reason. As it were, the condition for a norm’s effect to take place is defined by a clock alarm 
signaling the arrival of the specified time. The violation of such a norm takes place when that 
time interval expires without the agent effecting the appropriate reaction stipulated by the 
norm’s effect (i.e. either carry out a specific action or desist from doing so). 
 
On the other hand there are high-level norms that specify an explicit description of both the 
effect of the norm and the condition warranting it as well as the relationship between the time 
of the effect and the time of the warranting condition. Examples of work from the literature 
that formalized only high level norms include the work of Governatori, Rotolo and 
Sartor(2005) as well as Artikis and Sergot(2010). 
 
Our argument in this paper is that high-level norms are more appropriate for modeling real 
life norms of conduct than are low level norms.  This is because low-level formalisms cannot 
capture many real life norms that require a detailed description of a warranting situation than 
simply the striking of the clock. In addition to this, real life norms of conduct also carry time 
constraint between the time the agents should effect his obligation or prohibition and the time 
of the warranting condition.  
 
The violation of a high level norm is the failure of an agent to carry out the effect of the norm 
within the time constraint of the warranting situation. Furthermore, it is pertinent to 
determine the validity of the violated norm(s) as at the time the violation took place, because 
an invalid norm cannot be violated. A norm is said to be valid at a point in time if it is part 
(member) of the system of norms in consideration at that point in time.  The interval, during 
which the norm is valid, is called the external time of that norm (Marin and Sartor, 1999).   
 
 A particular instance of low level norm representation is the formalism of King et al. (2017) 
which treats a normative fluent as a relationship between an event that must hold by a certain 
deadline, so that an obligation for an action a to be taken by a deadline d is the fluent obl(a, 
d). Such an obligation is “discharged” if such an action takes place before the deadline or 
“violated” otherwise.   
 
This paper presents a logic programming based knowledge representation formalism for 
norms that captures a norm’s condition as a situation, its effect as an the obligation or 
prohibition of an action and the temporal constraint between them as a reified entity that 
captures qualitative and quantitative constraint. Section 2 discuses related works from the 
literature. Section 3 discusses the language of the formalism. Particularly, section 3.2.3 
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discusses the temporal constraint structures used to represent the reified temporal constraints 
expected between an agent’s action and situation. Section 3.4 discusses how these temporal 
constraints can be checked using constraint satisfaction rules expressed as Logic programs. 
Section 3.5 shows how to use all these to make inferences about norm violation. Section 3.6 
compares our formalism with some existing ones and points out parallel concepts from other 
papers. 
 
 
2. NORM REPRESENTATION IN THE LITERATURE 
 
According to Sergot(1990), there are two kinds of norms in legal reasoning. These are 
qualification norms and norms of conduct. Qualification norms define normative or legal 
properties and relationships of agents, while norms of conduct define how an ideal agent is 
expected to behave under certain circumstances. Consequently, unlike qualification norms, 
norms of conduct (or prescriptive norms) take cognizance of the fact that there is a difference 
between how an agent is expected to behave and how it might choose to behave in the real 
world. The departure between how an agent is expected to behave and how it eventually 
behaves is a violation of that expectation or norm. 
 
Much work has been carried out on the logical representation of such norms of conduct. 
Notable papers in this regard include the works of Stratulat et al (2001), Marin and 
Sator(1999), Sadri et al (2006) and Panagiotidis et al (2009). As Artikis(2003) observed on 
the work of Marin and Sator, the paper focused on three major issues namely: norm 
applicability, norm effect and norm validity. Norm applicability describes the time interval 
during which a norm’s (pre-) condition must hold in order for its effect to hold. The effect of 
a norm is the action an agent is expected to take or avoid taking when the norm’s 
precondition takes place. Norm validity at a time describes the recognition of that norm as 
part of the body of legislation at a time. Marin and Sartor went on to identify the limitations 
of Kowalski and Sergot’ s Event Calculus in solving these problems in the process of 
formalizing norms and presented an extension of Event Calculus for handling these problems. 
 
In Stratulat et al (2001) the norms are represented by what seem like a reified ternary 
predicate. For example an obligation is a triple O(Agent, Action-type, Time-Interval) that 
carries the information that an agent is obliged to carry out an action of the type Action-type 
during the time interval. For example in Stratulat’s language the statement  
 
holds(j, O(ag, a, k)) ………Axiom ST1 
 
states that an obligation for an agent to carry out an action a at the time interval k holds 
during time interval interval j. The interval k is the internal time of the norm in the language 
of Marin and Sator while the interval j is the external time during which the norm is in effect. 
Presumably k should be a subinterval of j. A violation of such a norm is inferred when the 
agent is found at a future time to have failed to carry out such an expected action within the 
prescribed time interval. 
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Similarly, Sadri et al(2006)’s representation of an obligation is the atom: 
 
obliged(act(Act, Actor, Parameters), T, TC) or  
prohibited(act(Act, Actor, Parameters), T, TC) 
 
Thus an assertion that the actor Actor carries out (or is prohibited from carrying out) the 
action Act at time T  which must satisfy the temporal constraint TC. Sadri et al’s temporal 
constraints show the time points that bound by the time e g 10 > T > 17.  
 
In addition, for most of the norms represented by Sadri et al(2006), the norm’s condition for 
an agent to be obliged to act or refrain from acting is set by time itself. Stratulat et al(2001)’s 
paper also shared this limitation. For example: you can’t park your car here between 10am 
and 5 pm. Rather this kind of representation is inadequate for representing a norm like: you 
can’t park your car here from the moment it starts raining until it’s 15 minutes after the rain. 
While norms of the earlier type can be regarded as low level norms in the sense that they can 
only be applied within a specific time frame, those of the  latter kind can be regarded as high 
level norms, in the sense that they apply anytime it rains. In that case it’s up to the agent to 
decide whether the norm is applicable in a particular situation and at what particular time an 
agent finds itself in a deontic position.  
 
A particular kind of low level norm is the normative fluent used by King et al(2017). Their 
normative fluent is written as ob(a, d), denoting an obligation to carry out an action of type a 
before a deadline d. The problem with this kind of deadline norms is that such norms can be 
satisfied by actions of similar type undertaken before this norm becomes active. The problem 
with this representation is that unless the record of an action that discharged a similar fluent 
in the past is removed from the knowledge base as soon as it is discharged, it can 
inadvertently discharge future obligations.     
  
This first gap is bridged in this paper by representing the time interval constraints using time 
point images (TPI), so that indefinite times and constraints can be represented. The second 
gap is also bridged here by using situations to model a norm’s condition. A situation can be 
described by the propositional fluents (e.g. a raining fluent) that characterize it. Similarly a 
situation can be associated with a certain time in which it holds as done by Pinto (1994). This 
will make it possible to describe the conditions under which an agent cannot park his/her car 
for each of the two norm examples given above.    
 
There are two major examples of norm representation formalisms that are indeed high level 
norms in the literature. The first is the temporalized formalization of legal norms by 
Governatori, Rotolo and Sartor(2005). In this formalization, a norm’s condition has an 
implication relationship with the norm’s effect (for example, the fact that an action is 
obligatory), with each side of the implication associated with relative times. A format for 
such rules looks like the following:   
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 condition : t   effect : t    k 
 
This rule reads like: if the condition holds at time t, then the effect (such as an action 
becoming obligatory) holds at time t  k. The first problem with this kind of formalization is 
that it leaves no room for reasoning about violations of the norm (as pointed out by the 
authors themselves), particularly because there is no way of identifying the norm being 
violated. The best that can be done is to identify the violation of the effect of the norm such 
as an obligation to carry out an action at some time relative to the time the condition arose.  
The second problem with it is that temporal relations between conditions and effects can be 
more complex than can be represented by constraints involving two time points. Firstly when 
conditions arise, they usually have a starting point and a termination point. Therefore an 
agent may have an obligation to act at some point relative to (i.e. before or after) the start or 
finish or the time interval the condition lasted for. For example a robo-sweeper may be 
obliged to start sweeping no later than 5 minutes after snowing stops. Another example is 
when an agent is obliged to carry out an action 10 minutes before the scheduled end of an 
event. 
 
Another example of a formalism we consider appropriate for high level norms in the 
literature is one based on the Event Calculus and implemented in PROLOG by Aritkis and 
Sergot(2010). An example of a norm that can be represented in Artikis and Sergot’s 
formalism is: A faculty is empowered to supervise three years after earning a doctorate. It is 
rendered thus: 
 
  holdsAt( pow(F, supervise(F, X)) = true, T)  
   happens(earnedDoctorate(F) = true, T – 1096), 
   holdsAt(enrolled(X) = true,  T). 
 
The representation of the robosweeper example (i.e. Robosweeper is obliged to start 
sweeping no later than 5 minutes after snowing stops) however, reveals some problems with 
EC representations such as this one. It can be rendered thus in Artikis and Sergot’s EC 
representation thus: 
 
  holdsAt(obl(Robosweeper, startweep) = true, T)  
   holdsAt(stop(snowing), T1), 
   T1  T, 
   T1 +5 > T. 
 
The problem with EC representations of norms stems from the fact that actions in EC are 
instantaneous. As such, when confronted with actions that have a duration such as sweeping, 
one can only capture the commencement and/or termination of such actions when necessary.  
A good representation of this norm however, should not only capture the commencement of 
the sweeping action, but the action in its entirety. The only way we can capture the sweeping 
action in an EC representation is to use the start and stop functions and treat sweep as an 
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event like snowing. However, from an agent’s point of view it is critical to distinguish 
between an event like snowing and an action like sweeping. 
   
Nonetheless, Both Governatori et al as well as Artikis and Sergot(2010) in their 
representations captured the essence of a high-level norm which are a norm’s condition and 
the essence of a temporal relationship between them. However, having a norm’s condition 
and effect appear on either sides of an implication as done by both Governatori et al(2005) 
and Artikis and Sergot(2010), makes it impossible to give an identity to a particular high 
level norm.  
 
In general many real life prescriptive norms are high-level norms. Besides, truly autonomous 
agents must be able to work with high level norms. Take for instance a real-life scenario. In 
an electronic institution where there is a norm that obliges an agent to supply an order within 
forty eight (48) hours after receiving the acknowledgement of payment for the order. The 
condition required for the agent to carry out the supply of the order (norm’s effect) is 
receiving the acknowledgment of payment for the order (norm’s condition). 
 
Although this kind of norm can easily be formalized in the logic of Governatori et al, as: 
 
 Pay-ack(o) : t   Obl(supply(o)) : t + 48  
 
We can only talk about the violation of the specific instances of the effect of this norm which 
is an obligation to supply an order at some given time (a low-level norm), and not the 
violation of the norm itself. Inferring which high level norm has been violated is critical to 
helping a sincere agent improve on its ability to be law-abiding. Communicating such norm 
violations also requires that each norm be identified so that the identity of the norm can be 
communicated to the erring agent. 
 
Finally, inferring a norm violation requires that one determines whether or not the norm in 
question is active or not as only an active norm can be violated. This requires that we be able 
to have assertions about a norm’s enactment and (if applicable) the repeal dates. This is only 
possible if each norm has an identity that can be used to refer to it. Such identities can even 
be quantified over in order to form general rules about norms. 
 
Thus the representation of the norm used in this paper carries the following information: 
 
The identity of the agent involved, 
 
A normative fluent such as obl(a) or pro(a) that indicates that an obligation to 
carry out an action a or a prohibition from carrying it out. This is the norm’s 
effect.  
 
A situation whose description will capture the nature of the condition 
warranting the effect of the norm,  
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The reified time constraint between the action and situation and  
The norm’s identity. 
 
A normative token is treated as the relation bringing the other five elements together. This 
formalization eliminates the need for a normative implication of the sort championed by 
Governatori et al. 
 
3.    REPRESENTATION OF HIGH LEVEL NORMS 
A norm is basically a rule. Each of these normative rules help in making inferences about 
what an agent is expected to do or desist from doing within a certain time frame. The 
inferences made from these normative rules are referred to as normative tokens. 
 
A normative token is when an agent finds it is expected to effect a normative fluent, within 
some time constraint, and because of, the arising of some named situation in conforming to a 
named normative rule. A normative token relation is represented by a predicate NormPos 
thus: 
 
NormPos : Agent  NormFluent  Situation  TC  Norm-Id  Boolean 
 
(where the normative fluent is derived from an application of the function obl to an action 
type) 
 
Norm-id is an identifier for the norm rule that produced the actual normative token which is 
an obligation. Every obligation that is produced by the norm bears the same norm-id. As such 
every rule that helps to infer obligations, prohibitions and permissions has a unique norm-id 
that it carries. This kind of rule naming is referred to by the term rule reification which is 
similar in spirit to the notion of Davidson's reification (Galton 1991), This is illustrated with 
Norm 3.1 and 3.2 as examples of rules generating this kind of normative tokens. 
 
In sections 3.1 – 3.3, the language employed is a many sorted standard first order predicate 
logic with equality and with standard semantics for operators or (), and (), negation () 
existential quantifier (), universal quantifier () implication( ) and equivalence(  ). This 
is needed to express the properties of relations such as “partially describe” or “fully 
describe”.  In section 3.4 and 3.5, we resort to expressing norms with a language that is close 
to standard logic programs with equality and typical non-classical implication represented by 
if as well as, non-classical negation represented by  .  
 
Time is viewed as a linear and discrete model in which we recognize both time intervals and 
instants to be known as the sort Interval or Instants. The relations among two time points are 
represented by the infix predicates: <, >, ,   with the signatures: 
 
 <, >, ,  : Instant  Instant   Boolean  
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The beginning and ending of Intervals represented by the functions begin and end 
respectively; of Intervals are Instants as the signature below shows: 
 
 begin :  Interval  Instants 
 end :  Interval  Instants 
 
In addition, we will use all of Allen(1984)’s binary interval relations represented by 
predicates: Meets, Before, Starts, Ends, During, Overlaps and their inverse relations.  In 
addition, we will use other binary relations built on these such as Within (interpreted as Starts 
or During or Ends) and (improper) Subinterval (interpreted Within or Equals) by 
Koomen(1989). 
 
3.1 Normative Fluents and Action Types and Tokens 
 
The basic sorts introduced in this subsection are normative fluents and Action types as well 
as Action Tokens. A normative fluent is either the obligation on the part of an agent to carry 
out an action of a certain type or the prohibition on the part of an agent from carrying out an 
action of a certain type. The permission on the part of an agent to carry out an agent can be 
taken as the negation of the prohibition to carry out the same action. Because normative 
fluents are reified, the notion of obligation and prohibitions will be treated as the functions 
obl and pro respectively. These are both reckoned to have the following signature: 
 
  obl, pro: ActionType  NormativeFluent  
 
In other words, the obl and pro functions each take an action type as argument and returns a 
normative fluent. Apart from these there is a notion of negation for normative fluents which 
is the function  with the signature: 
 
    : NormativeFluent  NormativeFluent 
 
The meaning of obl(a), where a is an action type a should be read as “permission not to 
carry out an action of type a”, while the meaning of pro(a) should be taken to be 
“permission to carry out an action of type a”. Norms that carry this kind of normative fluents 
cannot be violated. 
 
Action types themselves carry a functional structure, so that obl and pro can be regarded as 
higher order functions. An action type is usually a function denoted by a verb that describes 
the generic type of the action, while its argument will be the object of the action. For example 
an action type repair the car12 is the functional token repair(Car12). Thus the obligation to 
repair the car12 is the normative fluent: obl(repair(Car12)).  
 
So far we have been talking about an action type. However, there are instances when a 
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norm’s condition needs to be described by the occurring of an instance of an event type. In 
that case we define the time when an actual event takes place using a function timeA which 
given an action returns a time interval, with the signature: 
 
  timeA : Action  Interval  
 
Finally, assertions that make an actual event belong to a particular event type, are represented 
by the predicate Type-of-Action with the signature: 
   
Type-of-Action : Action  ActionType   Boolean  
 
 
3.2 Situations, Events, Processes 
 
The basic sorts introduced here are Fluents, Situations, Events  Processes and Time Intervals. 
In this paper, the conditions of a norm are modeled by situations. Our situation are similar to 
that described by Schubert(2000). A situation represents a complete state of the world with a 
time frame. Each fluent describes a specific aspect of a situation. In Schubert’s FOL** 
language there are two kinds of relations that may exist between a fluent f and a situation s. 
In one relation a fluent completely describes the situation written as f **s, while in the other 
the fluent partially describes the situation f *s. In FOL**, the relation between a situation and 
a fluent that holds in it, is in general, an entailment relation i.e. s ╞ f. Unlike FOL** however, 
our fluents which we will treat as functional tokens in our language are atomic propositions 
that do not require the use of quantifiers eg. Car17 is red, John loves Mary, etc. Speaking of 
functions, there is a time function for situations in this formalism which given a situation 
returns the time interval over which the situation persists. This function is timeS with the 
following signature: 
 
  timeS:  Situation   Interval.   
 
In the reified situation calculus of Pinto(1994), the Holds predicate is used to represent the 
relation between a fluent and the situation in which it holds. Holds in Pinto’s reified situation 
calculus does not in any way, suggest that a fluent completely describes a situation. As such 
we will thus use Holds(f, s) to connote the relation f partially describes s.  
 
Schubert(2000) has argued the need for having situations that are completely described by 
specific fluents  so that accurate causation relations can be expression between situations. The 
problem with only allowing situations to be partially described is that often causation 
relations are between certain aspects of situations. Other aspects of those situations are 
dormant in that relationship. This underscores the need for a completely describes relation 
between fluents and situation. Schubert renders this relation in FOL** as **. In order to 
respect the tradition from which this relation came from, we will use Holds** as relation 
between a fluent and the situation it completely describes so that Holds**(f, s) means f 
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completely describes s. There are two specific relations between Holds and Holds** 
described below: 
 
Axiom 3.2.1 
The relation “completely describes” is a specialization of “partially describes”. 
 
  f, s. Holds**(f, s)  Holds(f, s) 
 Axiom 3.2.2 
If f partially describes s, there exists another situation of the same time as s, which f 
completely describes.  
  
  f, s. Holds(f, s)  s1. Holds**(f, s1)  timeS(s) = timeS(s1)   
 
We will define an implication relationship among fluents as the predicate ImplyF thus: 
 
Axiom 3.2.3 
An implication relation exists among between a fluent and another, if the fact that it holds in 
any situation implies that the other holds in the same situation. 
   
f, f1. ImplyF(f, f1)   s.  Holds(f, s)    Holds(f1, s)   
 
A simple instance of the implication relationship between fluents will exist between a raining 
fluent and a wet fluent. The following axiom further clarifies the difference between the 
relations denoted by predicates Holds** and Holds. 
 
Axiom 3.2.4   
If f completely describes a situation, then no other fluent other than those implied by f can 
hold in that situation. 
 
f, s. Holds**(f, s)  (f1. f  f1   ( ImplyF(f, f1)   Holds(f1, s) )) 
 
Two special instances of fluents are the occurring of an event or the progression of a process. 
The fluents are represented by the functional structures: occurring(e) and prog(p) 
respectively, where occurring and prog are functions are applied on event token e and 
process p respectively giving rise to fluents with signatures: 
 
 occurring: Event  Fluent 
 prog : Process  Fluent 
 
 Each of these can partially or fully describe a situation. Just like situations both events and 
processes, have are eventualities with have an inherent time property. These are represented 
by time functions timeE and timeP for events and processes respectively, with the following 
signatures: 
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 timeE : Event  Interval 
 timeP : Process  Interval 
 
When an event or a process describes a situation, the time of that situation is the same as that 
of the event or process.  
 
Axiom 3.2.5 
 
When the occurring of an event or the progression of a process describes a situation, the time 
of the situation is the same as the time of the event or that of the process as the case may be.   
 
(a) Holds(occurring(e), s)  timeE(e) = timeS(s) 
(b) Holds(prog(p), s)  timeP(p)  = timeS(s) 
 
It is particularly important to be able to have situations completely described by these kinds 
of fluents, because such fluents actually give rise to the presence of other fluents. When the 
fact of an event occurring is a fluent that describes a situation, then the fact that certain agents 
play a role in that event is also a fluent that partially describes the situation. For the purpose 
of describing the relations between an actual event and an event type, as is needed in domain 
Axioms 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 below, we resort to using a predicate EventType thus:  
 
Axiom 3.2.6 
If a classroom event occurs within a situation, then there must be a particular agent that 
plays the role of a teacher in that situation. 
 
 e, s. Holds**(occurring(e), s)  EventType(e, Class)  
    !a. Holds(role(a, Teacher), s) 
 
Axiom 3.2.7 
If a classroom event occurs within a situation, then there must be at least one agent that plays 
the role of a student in that situation. 
 
 e, s. Holds**(occurring(e), s)  EventType(e, Class)  
   a. Holds(role(a, Student), s) 
 
Finally it is important to distinguish between a process and events has been done in the 
literature and summarized in Galton(2016). Our definition of processes is close to that of 
Sowa(2000) as cited by Galton. A process can be discrete or continuous. Discrete processes 
each involves a finite sequence of either event occurrences or states (described by fluents). 
Each step can either be an event (or action), a state of affairs (like in a natural process like a 
fermentation or decay) or another process which is a process by itself. A continuous process 
can be treated as constituted by a single event. Herein lies the difference between our view of 
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processes and Sowa’s who breaks each continuous process into initiation, continuation and 
termination phases.  
 
Definition 3.2.8 
A situation s is fully characterized by a process if Either that situation is fully characterized 
by either the occurring of an event Or there are two smaller situations whose times cover s 
and the first situation is fully characterized either by the occurrence of an event or a fluent 
and the second is also a process.    
 
 p, s. Holds**(prog(p), s)   
  (e Holds**(occurring(e), s))  
s1.(e Holds**(occurring(e), s1)  f Holds**(f, s1))  
   s2, p1. Holds(prog(p1), s2)  Cover(timeS(s1), timeS(s2), timeS(s))    
 
(where j, k, m. Cover(j, k, m)  Starts(j, m)  Finishes(k, m)  Meets(j, k)   
see (Koomen 1989) ) 
  
Either way, Axiom 3.2.7 above captures the definition of a process. 
 
 
3.3 Temporal Constraints 
 
The basic sorts introduced here are time point images (TPI) and Time Constraints (TC). A 
TPI is a relative point with an anticipated time interval. It can be the beginning (B), End (E) 
or any relative time point within the anticipated time interval. Therefore a TPI may be either 
of the constants {B, E} or an application of the time displacement function tdisp to either B 
or E and an integer. B and E signify the beginning and end of a time integer. The signatures 
are given below: 
 
 tdisp:  TPI  Integer  TPI 
 
Our approach to composing constraints here is therefore is to let each basic constraint relate 
some time point image (i.e. its beginning, end, or some point in between) of the time interval 
of the effect of a norm which is the time of the action of the type specified, with some time 
point image of the effect of the norm. A basic temporal constraint is composed by the 
application one of the functions such as eq (equal), ge (greater than or equal to), le (less than 
or equal to), gt greater than) and lt (less than) to an ordered pair of TPI, the first relating to 
the action (or norm’s effect) while the second is related to the situation (norm’s condition) 
with the signatures: 
 
  eq, ge, gt, le, lt : TPI  TPI  TC 
 
The functions and, or and not introduced here are used to make temporal constraints with 
natural Boolean meanings and the following signatures:  
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                     not  : TC  TC  
                  and, or : TC  TC  TC 
For example:  
 
eq(B, E) means the first interval ends exactly when the second interval begins. 
 
eq(tdisp(B, 3), E) means the second interval ends 3 units into the beginning of the first 
interval. 
 
Other temporal constraints can be composed from other temporal constraints by the functions 
and, or as well as neg. For example, and(eq(B, B), eq(E, E)) describes  two intervals that are 
equal. 
 
Each of Allen(1984)’s qualitative relations can be represented by our TCS. The following are 
the equivalences between Allen’s interval relations and our TCS. 
 
Before is equivalent to  lt(E, B) 
Overlaps  is equivalent to and(lt(B, B), lt(E,E)) 
Contains is equivalent to and(lt(B, B), gt(E, E)) 
Starts is equivalent to  and(eq(B, B), lt(E, E)) 
Finishes is equivalent to  and(gt(B, B), eq(E, E)) 
Meets is equivalent to  eq(E, B) 
 
A major advantage of the TCS representation is that it can represent constraints that combine 
both qualitative and quantitative relationships. Examples of such relationships are: 
 
Starts not later than 4 units of time into is equivalent to le(B, tdisp(B, 4)) 
Ends 10 units of time into     is equivalent to   eq(E, tdisp(B, 10) 
 
These are the kinds of constraints that many real-life norms may contain as holding between 
norm conditions and their effects.  
 
Finally we must state that in using the context of normative positions, each basic constraint’s 
argument is pair of the action-type’s time interval and the situation’s time interval. For 
example the following norm, identified by Norm001, means the agent Robosweeper has an 
obligation to begin sweeping snow not later than 4 time units after a situation in which it 
snowed. 
 
NormPos(Robosweeper, obl(Sweep_Snow), Snowing, and(gt(B, E), le(B, disp(E,4))), 
Norm001) 
 
3.4 Normative Rules and Rule Reification 
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In our formalism, norms or normative rules are represented as Logic programs in which the 
heads are normative tokens and the bodies contain the description of norm’s conditions which 
are represented by situations. i.e. 
 
  Normative-Token (NT) if 
     Description of the situation that appears in NT  
 
Each normative token is an assertion that an agent is to conform to a normative fluent, in 
some named situation (which is later described in the body of the clause), within some 
temporal constraint.  
 
This representation eliminates the need for a normative implication in the sense used by 
Governatori et al(2005) and Artikis and Sergot(2010) because unlike these previous 
formalisms in which a norm’s condition and its effect are antecedent and consequent in an 
implication.  This is achieved by making the norm’s condition, some situation s and the 
norm’s effect, some normative fluent, terms for the 5-tuple normative token(reification). Thus 
when a situation arises whose description matches what appears in the body of the normative 
rule, a normative token is inferred which is derived from the head of the normative rule.  
 
This reification of both the condition and effect of norms is the main difference between this 
formalism and that of Governatori et al. and Artikis and Sergot. For these both of these 
formalisms, it is virtually impossible to reify a norm’s conditions without resorting to 
situations as we have done. 
 
The last term of a normative token is an identifier for the normative rule that produced it. 
This value assigned to this term is the identification for the normative rule from which the 
normative token was inferred. Although the identifier only appears in the head of the 
normative rule, it is in fact an attribute of the normative rule and it is the identifier for the 
rule. Indeed every normative token derived from the same normative rule bears that same 
identity. This is a special kind of reification for rules we shall call rule reification. 
 
As we will see from the examples in the next section, it is often necessary to describe other 
situations that have some qualitative relations with the situation being described.  
 
3.5 Real life Norms 
 
In this section we present our formalism’s representation of some real life norms. It is a rather 
trivial exercise to show that the formalism is able to represent all low-level norms used to test 
a formalism such as that Stratulat et al (2001). We will return to that question later. At this 
point our focus is on representing high level norms.  
 
Norm 3.1 
A teacher assigned to teach a class must arrive either on time or not later than 10 minutes 
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into the time of a class. 
 
a, v, s, 
NormPos(a, obl(arrive-at(v)), s, and(le(E, tplus(B,10)), ge(E, B)), OB101) if 
Ǝ e. 
Holds**(occurring(e), s) ˄ 
EventType(e, Class) ˄ 
Holds(venue(e, v), s) ˄ 
Holds(role(a, Teach), s)). 
 
Norm 3.2 
Student must register for his/her courses in a semester within one month of the 
commencement of the semester. 
 
a, o, s. 
NormPos(a, obl(register-for(a,sem))), s, and(and(ge(E, B), le(E,B, 30)), ge(B,B)), OB102) if 
 Ǝs1, s2.Holds**(studentship(a),s1) ˄ 
ProcessType(sem, Semester) ˄ 
Holds**(prog(sem), s) ˄ 
Within(timeS(s), timeS(s1))˄ 

 Holds(on-suspension(a, sem), s). 
 
A prohibition is a norm that disallows an agent from carrying out an action of a certain type 
within some time interval that has a temporal relation with the warranting situation 
(condition) of the prohibition. The structure of a prohibition is the same as that of a normative 
position except that the normative fluent is derived from the application of the pro function to 
an action type.   
 
The norm 3.3 and norm 3.4 illustrate examples of rules that infer such normative tokens. 
 
Norm 3.3 
Student must not be allowed to come in for an examination thirty (30) minutes after the 
commencement of the examination. 
 
a, s, e. 
NormPos(a, pro(arrive(v)), s,  gt(E, tplus(30)}, PR0103), if 
Holds**(occuring(e), s) ˄ 
EventType(e, Examination)) ˄ 
Holds(venue(e,v), s) ˄ 
Holds(role(a, Candidate), s). 
Norm 3.4 
It is prohibited for members of university community to release confidential document of the 
university to public domain without authorization. 
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a, doc, s, 
Prohibition(a, pro(release(doc)), s, or(and(lt(B, E), ge(B, B)), and(le(E, E), gt(E, B))), 
PRO014) if 
Ǝs1,s2, u. 
Holds**(alive(doc), s1) ˄ 
Holds**(statusdoc(doc, Confidential),s) ˄ 
Holds**(employ(u, a), s2) ˄ 
University(u) ˄ 
Owns(doc, u)  
Subinterval(timeS(s), timeS(s1)) ˄ 
Subinterval(timeS(s), timeS(s2)) ˄ 
 
A permission is a norm that allows an action by an agent as a result of a certain situation 
arising.  In this formalization, we will treat permissions as the fluent negation of prohibitions 
denoted by the function . 
 
Examples of this is given in norm 3.5 and norm 3.6. 
 
Norm 3.5 
Members of the university community are permitted to put on their official identity card while 
on duty.  
a, s. 
NormPos(a, pro( put_id-on(a)), s, and(ge(B, B), le(E, E)), PER010) if  
  Ǝu, s1 
Holds**(onDuty(a), s)  
Holds**(employ(a, u) s1)  
University(u)  
Within(timeS(s), timeS(s1) 
 
Norm 3.6 
Lecturer is permitted to give reading books on his assigned course to the student at the 
beginning of lecture in a semester.  
a, b, s. 
NormPos(a, pro(give(b)), s, le(E, B), PER012) if  
Ǝco. 
Holds**(prog(co), s) ˄ 
ProcessType(co, Course) ˄ 
Holds(role(a, Teacher), s) ˄ 
Holds(role(b, ReadingBook), s) 
 
Having represented norms, it is important to discuss the representation of the validity of those 
norms. Norm validity is determined by the date of enactment and . Let us take as an example 
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the constitutive norm from the formalization of the British Nationality Act 1981 (Segot et al., 
1986). 
 
The norm any person born in the UK becomes a British citizen is a norm that was only valid 
until 1981. A representation of that norm in the proposed language is presented thus: 
 
x, s 
NormPos(HMG, obl(grant-citizenship(x)), s, eq(E, B), NBB-1) if 
Holds**(born-in(x, UK), s) 
 
However, any agent interpreting that norm on behalf of Her Majesty's Government (HMG) 
must be aware that the validity of the norm is from 1950 and 1981 i.e. 
 
Enact(NBB-l, 1950) 
Repeal(NBB-1, 1981) 
 
As such it is only if the norm situation s happened within that interval of validity that the 
norm NBB-1 is valid. Validity is an important condition for deciding norm violation as we 
shall demonstrate. 
 
3.5 Satisfying Temporal Constraints 
 
Our attention now turns to determining when two time intervals satisfy a certain temporal 
constraints and for this purpose, we will define constraint satisfaction rules (CSR) that will 
determine whether an ordered pair of intervals satisfies a temporal constraint. 
 
Intuitively, it is easy to see how the satisfaction of any of our basic constraints can translate 
into logical relations that involve two time points.  Similarly the satisfaction of a compound 
constraint can be broken down into the satisfaction of constituent constraints.   
 
CSRs for compound temporal constraints are recursive in the sense that they are composed 
from other CSRs as illustrated by the following axiom: 
 
Axiom 3.5.1 
tc1, tc2, j, k. 
Satisfy-Cons( j,  k, and(tc1, tc2))  if  
  Satisfy-Cons( j, k, tc1)  
  Satisfy-Cons(j, k, tc2). 
 
Two similar rules exist for the or function. That is embodied in axiom 5.2(a) and (b) below: 
 
Axiom 3.5.2 (a) 
j, k, tc1, tc2. 
Satisfy-Cons( j,  k, or(tc1, tc2))  if  
  Satisfy-Cons(j, k, tc1) 
Axiom 3.5.2 (b) 
j, k, tc1, tc2. 
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Satisfy-Cons(j, k, or(tc1, tc2))  if  
  Satisfy-Cons( j, k, tc2) 
 
The other non-recursive rules handle basic temporal constraints. These rules represent a 
simple translation of each of the temporal constraint functions into the equivalent relation. 
The following axioms 5.3 to 5.6 are all examples of the lt constraint. 
 
Axiom 3.5.3 
j, k, t1, t2. 
Satisfy-Cons(j, k, lt(tdisp(B, t1), disp(B, t2)) ) if 
  begin(j) + t1 < begin(k) +t2 
Axiom 3.5.4 
 j, k. 
Satisfy-Cons(j, k, lt(B, E)) if  
  begin( j) < end(k) 
 
Axiom 3.5.5 
j, k. 
Satisfy-Cons(j,  k, lt(E, B)) if  
  end(j) < begin( k) 
Axiom 3.5.6 
j, k. 
Satisfy-Cons(j,  k, lt(E, E)) if 
  end(j) < end(k) 
 
The next section discusses norm how constraint satisfaction rules is used to infer norm 
violations. 
 
3.6      NORM CONFORMANCE AND VIOLATIONS 
 
In order to make inferences about norm violation we need to know the existence of three 
fundamental conditions. The first condition will be the existence of a normative token such as 
an agent’s obligation or prohibition to carry out or desist from carrying out an action. The 
second condition will be the failure to conform to the requirement of the normative token. 
The third condition is the validity of the normative rule at the time the condition held.  
 
The condition for a norm to be valid with respect to a situation is for the situation to take 
place while the norm’s enactment remains in force. This is formalized as: 
 
Axiom 3.6.0 
norm-id, s. 
Validwrt(norm-id, s) if 
Enact-at(norm-id, t)  
t <= begin(timeS(s))  
t1. (t  t1  end(timeS(s))   Repeal(norm-id, t1))   
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The conformance of an agent to a norm requiring an agent’s obligation requires the existence 
of an action of the expected type to be carried by the agent within the required time limit. 
This is formalized by the following clause: 
 
Axiom 3.6.1 
a, norm-id, s. 
Conform(a, norm-id, s) if 
 act-type, tc, act. 
NormPos( a, obl( act-type), s, tc, norm-id)  
Type-of-Action(act, act-type)  
Actor(a, act)  
Validwrt(norm-id, s)   
Satisfy-Cons(timeA(act), timeS(s), tc). 
 
The violation of an obligation takes place when in the occurrence of the situation within the 
validity period of the rule that generated the normative token, the agent implicated is unable 
to carry out the needed action within the required time constraint. That is formalized as the 
following  clause: 
 
Axiom 3.6.2 
a. norm-id, s. 
Violate(a, norm-id, s) if 
 act-type, tc. 
NormPos(a, obl(act-type), s, tc, norm-id)  
Validwrt(norm-id, s)    
act  (Type-of-Action (act, a-type)  
 Actor(a, act)  
 Satisfy-Cons(timeA(act), timeS(s), tc) ) 
 
In the case of a prohibition, a violation takes place when in the case of the occurrence of the 
situation, the implicated agent carries out the forbidden action during a time interval that 
satisfies the constraint with the time of the situation. Such a violation is formalized thus:  
 
Axiom 3.6.3 
p, norm-id, s. 
Violate(a, norm-id, s) if  
 act-type, tc, act. 
NormPos( p, pro(act-type), s, tc, norm-id)  
Type-of-Action(act, act-type)  
Actor(a, act)  
Validwrt(norm-id, s)  
Satisfy-Cons(timeA(a), timeS(s), tc). 
 
Similarly conformance to a norm that is a prohibition is the absence of the prescribed action 
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within the prescribed time constraint. That is contained in the following axiom: 
 
Axiom 3.6.4 
a. norm-id, s.  
Conform(a, norm-id, s) if 
  act-type, tc. 
NormPos(a, pro(act-type), s, tc, norm-id)  
Validwrt(norm-id, s)   
 act (Type-of-Action (act, act-type)  
  Actor(a, act)  
  Satisfy-Cons(timeA(act), timeS(s), tc) ) 
 
However, an agent needs not do anything else to conform to a permission to either carry out 
or avoid an action. That idea is formalized in Axiom 3.6.5. 
 
Axiom 3.6.5 
a, norm-id, s. 
Conform(a, norm-id, s) if  
  act-type, tc. NormPos(a, pro(act-type), s, tc, norm-id) 
 
 
Axiom 3.6.6 
a, norm-id, s. 
Conform(a, norm-id, s) if  
  act-type, tc. 
  NormPos(a, obl(act-type), s, tc, norm-id) 
 
This approach contrasts with timed violations that was implemented by Stratulat et al[21]. In 
their work, a violation of an obligation is said to have taken place at a time t, if an agent has 
an obligation to carry out an action during the time interval (t1, t2) and as at time t which is 
later than t2 the action has not yet been taken. We believe that this approach of theirs is 
flawed because a violation is best understood as occurring under some particular 
circumstances rather than as occurring at some particular time. For example it is more 
meaningful to infer that: 
 
Mr X violated the of promptness obligation with regard to the CSC777 class of 1 
April 2016  
 
than to infer that: 
       
Mr X is reckoned to have violated an obligation to report at the Faculty Lecture 
theatre between 10 and 10:10 on 1 April 2016. 
  
 
4. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING FORMALISMS 
 
The norm representation formalism that is closest to that developed in the paper is the one 
offered by Panagiotidi, Nieves and Vazquez-Salceda(2009). In their representation, a norm is 
a 6-ary relation which consists of: 
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The actor  
The (deontic) modality, which may either be an obligation or a permission. 
The activating condition for the norm 
The maintenance condition for the norm 
Deontic Statement and, 
The deactivating condition 
 
The activating condition is the equivalent to the norm’s precondition. The deontic statement 
is a description of the state change that the agent under obligation is expected to effect. The 
deactivating condition is a sign that the state change has been effected.  A norm becomes 
activated when the activating condition becomes true and remains activated until the 
deactivating condition becomes true. The deactivating condition is satisfied when the agent 
has successfully effected the requirement of the norm. The maintenance condition captures 
the deadline for an active norm to become deactivated. Therefore a violation occurs when an 
active norm remains active when its maintenance condition has become untrue (i.e. the 
deadline has been passed while the deactivating condition is yet unsatisfied by the agent).     
 
However there are significant differences between the approach presented in this paper and 
their approach. Firstly, the representation in this paper does not only capture activating 
conditions; rather, it captures named instances of their occurrences as situations. So that it is 
possible to have named instances of an event or process type as a situation. That is not the 
case with the Panagiotidi et al’s representation. Again their inference of violation is based on 
the observing changes in condition and not necessarily on the occurrence or non-occurence of 
actions. 
 
The norm in Panagiotidi et al about the obligation of a repair company rc to repair a car 
within 4 days of taking the car to the garage will be rendered thus: 
 
NormPos(rc, obl(repair(car17)), s, and(ge(B, B), le(E, disp(E, 4))), OBRC1) if 
Holds(arrive(car17, Garage), s) 
 
We wish to note that our representation allows us to state the car repair that will satisfy the 
new obligation cannot precede the arrival of the car at the garage. This way we can avoid 
mistaking a previous repair done on car17, with the repair required for a new visit to the 
garage. This is an advantage that our formalism has over formalisms such as King et al 
(2017) and Panagiotidi et al (2009) that depend on deadlines. 
 
Hashmi, Governatori and Moe(2016) present a taxonomy of obligations that expands on a 
simple categorization of obligations due to Governatori (2010).  A maintenance obligation is 
one in which a norm’s effect must continue throughout the time of the obligation (or some 
specified situation). The norm represented by example 2 in this paper is one such norm.   
 
It is also the case that 4.1 is an example of Governatori’s achievement obligation.  
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An achievement obligation is one in which an actor is expected to carry out the action at least 
once within the time limit. An example of this which can be represented in the language of 
this paper is:  
 
The Prime Minister must pay the Queen a visit during the parliamentary break. 
 
The representation for this in the representation language presented in this paper would treat 
the parliamentary break as an event whose occurring constitutes the warranting situation and 
the agent whose visitation action to the Queen must fall within that situation is the Prime 
Minister. 
 
Finally in this section, in order to demonstrate that our formalism is versatile enough to 
represent low level norms, we present a representation for a norm from Stratulat et al (2001) 
that obliges a taxpayer to pay up within the first 31 days of the year, thus:  
 
NormPos(a, obl(pay-tax), s, or(eq(E, B), le(E, disp(B, 31)),  OBLTAX1) if 
    y( begin(timeS(s)) = (January, 1 y)  
          end(times(s)) = (December, 31, y))   
    Holds(taxpayer(a), s). 
 
The good side of our representation is that any violation can report on the year for which a 
violation took place and the identifier for the particular tax code violated, which in 
representation is OBLTAX1. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has identified two broad categorizations for prescriptive norms in the literature.  
High level norm representations capture the norm’s condition and effect as well as the 
temporal constraints between them. The norm’s condition is treated as a situation warranting 
the need for an agent to either carry out or refrain from carrying out an action of a certain 
type. The effect of the norm is the action that the agent is obliged or permitted to take or 
prohibited from taking.   
 
This contrasts with other approaches, which accounts a norm as the obligation or permission 
to take an action or the prohibition from taking an action within a particular time interval. 
The key disadvantage of low-level norms is that an agent’s autonomy is curtailed if s/he 
needs an external prescription in order to know what actions s/he is expected or allowed to 
take at specific times. On the other hand, an agent with a high level norm representation of 
norms can determine from that representation, at what times an actions they have an 
obligation to act or prohibited from acting. The difference between the two approaches is 
somewhat like that between low-level programming and high-level programming. 
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The major disadvantage of high level norms as they appear in the existing literature is that 
generalized violation inference is practically impossible. The formalism for high-level norm 
representation presented in this paper fixes that problem by relaxing the strict normative 
implication relationship between a norm’s condition and its effect as done by Governatori et 
al(2005) and Artikis and Sergot(2010). The formalism also makes it possible for norms to be 
identified through rule reification. 
 
Another key advantage of low level norms it easily enables an agent to detect when there are 
contradictory norms as shown by Artikis(2003). A contradiction occurs when there two 
different norms, one of which obliges an agent to carry out an action of a certain type, and the 
other prohibits actions of the same type at around the same time.  In order to detect 
contradictory norms, there is a need for a logical mechanism to convert high level norms into 
low level norms on an as needed basis. 
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